Subjective completion beliefs and the demand for post-secondary education by Kunz, Johannes S & Staub, Kevin E
  
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 218 
 
 
Subjective completion beliefs and the demand for 
post-secondary education 
 
 
 
 
 Johannes S. Kunz and Kevin E. Staub 
 
 
 
February 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Zurich 
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjective completion beliefs and the demand for post-secondary
education∗
Johannes S. Kunz
University of Zurich
Kevin E. Staub
University of Melbourne, and IZA
February 22, 2016
Abstract
The outcome of pursuing a post-secondary educational degree is uncertain. A student might
not complete a chosen degree for a number of reasons, such as academic insufficiency or financial
constraints. Thus, when considering whether to invest in post-secondary education, students must
factor in their completion probability into their decision. We study the role of this uncertainty in
educational choices using students’ subjective beliefs about completing a post-secondary education,
which were elicited prior to students’ completing secondary education. We relate these subjective
completion probabilities to their subsequent educational choices and outcomes using representa-
tive survey data from Germany. Following the students over time, we find that the initial beliefs
are predictive of intentions to invest in education, actual subsequent educational investments, and
degree completion. We assess the heterogeneity of the impact across different educational paths.
After controlling for academic ability, we find that subjective beliefs are most relevant in choosing a
vocational education. In addition to reduced form models, we estimate a structural choice model of
sequential investment in education that allows for unobserved tastes and preferences for education
and forward-looking behavior. The results confirm the influence of subjective completion beliefs on
choosing a post-secondary education.
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1 Introduction
Educational choice is one of the most important career decisions young adults have to make, and
one that must be made under partial information. Students not only face the difficulty of having to
predict labor market prospects for several educational degrees —an endeavoring task even for highly
distinguished scholars (Manski, 1993)— but also the challenge of having to predict their own returns to
each of these degrees. When choosing an educational track, students further need to foresee their own
abilities for that new educational environment and their chances of succeeding in such an environment.
Understanding the role of uncertainty in individuals’ post-secondary educational choices is essential
for designing effective educational policies. For instance, if students’ expectations are misaligned,
providing additional information can be a cost-effective measure to enhance educational choices, and
eventual career success.
In this study, we assess the role of uncertainty about completing an educational degree in young
adults’ education choices. We show how subjective beliefs about completing a post-secondary edu-
cation, elicited while in secondary education are important predictors of post-secondary educational
aspirations, enrollment, and completion. We find that both beliefs and educational aspirations are
strongly related to academic ability and personality traits. Conversely, actual enrollment and comple-
tion depend to a larger extent on family characteristics, the state of the local labor market, and the
regional supply and demand in the post-secondary education market, which suggests a potential for
informational policy interventions. In addition, we assess effect heterogeneity across post-secondary
educational tracks. Academic ability appears to be the main driver of subjective beliefs in choosing a
university education. In contrast, subjective beliefs of those choosing a vocational education seem to
be driven by other characteristics. Finally, we develop and estimate a structural educational choice
model that accounts for unobserved preferences for post-secondary education, forward-looking behav-
ior, and the sequentiality of choices. We find that the subjective completion beliefs are most decisive
for adolescents with low academic ability and weak preferences for education; a group that has largely
been ignored in the present literature.
The context of this study is the secondary and post-secondary educational system in Germany,
which is renowned for its well-functioning apprenticeship system. Apprenticeship systems are now
tested and implemented in several countries (including the US, cf. President Barack Obama’s State of
the Union Address, 2014) motivated by the low youth unemployment rates observed in countries with
apprenticeship systems. In Germany, when finishing secondary education at the age of 16 to 17, young
adults choose between dropping out of education, investing in an apprenticeship, or continuing with
general education that enables them to enroll in an university. In addition to analyzing the demand for
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education under conditions of uncertain outcomes, we study how the demand varies across educational
tracks, which is relevant to policy makers who aim to introduce apprenticeship systems.
In general, when studying choice under uncertainty, researchers have to assume how expectations
are formed (Manski, 2004). Most commonly, researchers impose rational expectations; e.g., that
individuals’ predictions, usually about future wage distributions, are unbiased. In the context of indi-
viduals’ educational choices it is important to note that even if students were able to accurately predict
the future wage distribution, their (perceived) internal rates of return —the rates upon which they
act— might be very different from the aggregate returns.1 By far, the most widely used alternative is
to use direct measures of elicited subjective beliefs, which circumvents these problems (Manski, 2004).
Several studies show that the use of elicited expectation data can be superior to those constructed
using rational expectation assumptions, and they are meaningful measures in educational choice mod-
els (e.g., Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014; Huntington-Klein, 2015b; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2012; Zafar, 2011a). Although the literature on educational decision making under uncertainty using
elicited subjective beliefs is rapidly growing, we advance the literature in important dimensions. We
assess the role of prior subjective beliefs formed in secondary education in a representative population
survey and follow these adolescents over time until they complete their post-secondary education.2
Second, much of the existing literature on the demand for post-secondary education focuses on invest-
ment, rather than on aspirations or completion.3 Thus, we assess each of these three outcomes while
also accounting explicitly for uncertainty in students’ choices.
In contrast to the existing literature that investigates the uncertainty about wages or the likeli-
hood of unemployment, our main focus is on completion uncertainty. Although some theoretical work
includes completion uncertainty (e.g., Altonji, 1993; Comay, Melnik and Pollatschek, 1973; Manski,
1989), there is little empirical work in this area. Theoretical studies emphasize the sequentiality of
the educational decisions and that “[d]ifferences in dropout probabilities may be more important than
differences in ex post payoffs in determining the ex ante return to attending a particular school,”
1Several approaches were proposed to circumvent rational expectations. Early approaches based on structural as-
sumptions that distinguish ex ante from ex post returns include Carneiro et al. (2003), Cunha, Heckman and Navarro
(2005), and Cunha and Heckman (2007). Their framework is also applied recently in Foley, Gallipoli and Green (2014).
Another approach is to include measures of uncertainty within the expected wage functions of Roy-type selection mod-
els; for example, Mazza (2014) introduces the (rational expectation) variance of earnings and Fossen and Glocker (2014)
include risk preferences.
2Also related to our study is the evolving literature on college major choice using subjective beliefs:
Arcidiacono, Hotz and Kang (2013), Arcidiacono et al. (2014), Hastings et al. (2015), Huntington-Klein (2015c),
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014a), and Wiswall and Zafar (2015a). In Germany there are no majors, as stu-
dents specialize at the beginning of their studies. However, we follow a similar approach as these studies by allowing for
selection into different educational tracks.
3One reason is that the data on completion is necessarily incomplete: individuals can always come back and acquire
more education. For a detailed discussion of educational completion, see Turner (2004) and Bound and Turner (2011).
Notable exceptions are Venti and Wise (1983) and Light and Strayer (2000). Similarly, the literature on aspirations is
still comparatively small, although it has been growing recently (e.g., Christofides et al., 2015; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015b;
Zachary and Zafar, 2015).
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(Altonji, 1993, p74).4 This hypothesis is empirically supported by Hussey and Swinton (2011), based
on a predicted likelihood of completion. However, such predicted completion probabilities are limited
in that they are only a crude proxy for the subjective beliefs on which people act. We contribute to
this literature by integrating elicited subjective completion probabilities into a sequential model of
educational choice. In this respect, our analysis is most closely related to Wiswall and Zafar (2015a),
which also uses students’ subjective completion beliefs. Our research addresses complementary ques-
tions such as how the choice process differs for adolescents not enrolled in college and how these beliefs
relate to actual completion. Our paper is the first to study subjective completion beliefs assessed be-
fore the end of secondary education in a population survey in the context of a detailed educational
investment model.
One way in which completion uncertainty affects educational choice is by simply amplifying ex
ante wage uncertainty. However, completion uncertainty may have important consequences beyond
that general channel. For example, various non-pecuniary aspects have been shown to be relevant to
educational choice (see Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011, for a recent summary). In order to benefit
from them, staying in the chosen educational path and/or completing the degree might be crucial.
For instance, studies using elicited subjective beliefs about labor market prospects consistently find
the (non-financial) consumption value of education or major-specific unobserved tastes to be the
main drivers of educational choices (i.e., Huntington-Klein, 2015a; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a).5 Such
preference-related factors are not affected by pure labor market uncertainty, but they can be affected
by completion uncertainty.6 Our results also point to unobserved preferences for a post-secondary
education that play a substantial role in students’ choices.
Our study is also closely related to the literature on learning about one’s own academic abil-
ity (or preferences).7 The central finding in this literature is that learning about one’s own abil-
ity is based mainly on academic ability conveyed by students’ grade point averages [GPA] (e.g.,
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012, 2014b; Zafar, 2011b). Although these studies offer a valuable
4Manski (1989) raises an important point by clarifying that drop-out rates are not necessarily undesirable from a
social planner’s point of view: since educational outcomes are uncertain, schooling should be evaluated based on ex ante
returns rather than on ex post success rates.
5Similar evidence comes from more structural approaches that do not rely on subjective beliefs. For instance,
D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel (2013) use a sophisticated Roy model and find non-pecuniary aspects to be predominant
in educational choice.
6Evidence whether the provision of information about the labor market induces students to invest more in education
is mixed, which can be interpreted as broadly in line with our view that there is more to uncertainty than pure wage
uncertainty. Supporting evidence comes from developing countries, for instance, see Jensen (2010) for evidence from
Dominican Republic and Nguyen (2008) for Madagascar. Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013) find that high school students
in Canada update their beliefs in the context of an information experiment. Yet in Finland, Kerr et al. (2014) find that
—while students do update their beliefs— there is no significant effect on enrollment; similar results are reported in
Fryer (2013). Assessing students’ choice process in more detail is therefore highly valuable.
7Bulman (2015) shows that providing young adults with better information about their own ability impacts enrollment
and college graduation. He finds that important factors other than aptitude deter college attendance, which might be
explained by subjective beliefs about educational outcomes.
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assessment of the subjective beliefs at various points in time and in great detail, thus far they have
focused on single institutions rather than a representative sample. Milla (2014) adds to and supports
the generalizability of the previous findings by studying aspiration updating in responses to changes
in GPA using a population survey of college students. Still, such a design imposes a sample selection.
By exclusively focussing on college students it ignores young adults who dropped out of education
because they were less optimistic about their educational prospects. We contribute to this literature
by assessing initial subjective beliefs prior to college enrollment in a representative survey population
and by providing evidence on both beliefs and educational aspirations at this early stage. Our evidence
supports and extends Zafar’s presumption that “prior belief[s] [at the start of college] continue[s] to
be important. In attempting to understand the choice of college majors, it might be useful to focus on
students at earlier stages of their schooling (for example, in high school) and analyze their subjective
beliefs” (Zafar, 2011b, p339f).8
Throughout our analyses we account for personality skills, which have been highlighted as main
determinants of educational success (see Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2006, and references
therein). In particular, we show how subjective beliefs relate to the Big Five personality measures,
risk attitudes, and locus of control, all of which are now ubiquitous in economic applications (see, for
example, Borghans et al., 2006; Caliendo, Cobb-Clark and Uhlendorff, 2015; Dohmen et al., 2010).
Of special interest to our design is the locus of control, as Coleman and DeLeire (2003) hypothesize
that students with a more internal locus of control (i.e., students who believe their actions affect their
outcomes) have higher subjective beliefs about their own returns to education, which increases their
efforts and investments in their human capital. Our results support the hypothesis that one’s locus of
control affects educational choices via subjective beliefs.
Finally, our study is related to recent contributions assessing the role of subjective beliefs as a medi-
ator and a potential explanation of educational differentials in parental unemployment (Pinger, 2015),
family background (Keller and Neidho¨fer, 2014), or gender and migration (Tolsma, Need and De Jong,
2010). Our framework might prove useful in studying the mediating role of subjective beliefs, since
it integrates investment in both secondary and tertiary education jointly in both reduced-form and
structural models.
In sum, the main contribution of this study is to provide a better understanding of uncertainty
in educational choices and a broad assessment of subjective completion beliefs of young adults. Our
analyses include how beliefs are determined and how beliefs relate to intentions to invest in education,
8Due to data limitations, we do not examine subjective beliefs at multiple time points. A detailed analysis of the
process behind learning about one’s own ability and the evolution of subjective beliefs is beyond the scope of this study,
but remain key questions for future research.
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actual investments, and degree completion. We explicitly account for the sequentiality of choices and
forward-looking behavior of individuals. Moreover, we relate students’ beliefs to individual charac-
teristics, family background, personality skills, regional labor and education market conditions, and
unobserved tastes and preferences for education. The remainder of this study proceeds as follows: In
Section 2, we describe the institutional features of the educational system in Germany and present the
data we use. In Section 3, we assess determinants of subjective completion beliefs. In Section 4, we
relate the beliefs to educational outcomes and present how the impact of the subjective beliefs varies
with selection on observables and unobservables. In Section 5, we presents effect heterogeneity across
different educational tracks, and in Section 6 we develop and estimate a structural model of sequential
educational choice. Section 7 concludes our paper, briefly summarizing our key findings.
2 Institutional setting, data, and descriptive statistics
Institutional setting
A simplified version of Germany’s educational system is depicted in Figure 1, in which we briefly
summarize the system’s key features that are relevant to our analysis (more information can be found
in Wo¨lfel and Heineck, 2012).
— — — Figure 1 about here — — —
The German educational system is characterized by early tracking, which takes place after grade
4 (elementary school), at age 9 to 11 years.9 Based on grades and teachers’ recommendations, the
children are tracked into three streams according to their academic ability.10 The statistical agency in
Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014, p27) reported that in 2012, 10% of children were assigned
to the lower track, 19% to the intermediate track, 40% to the upper track (high school), and the
remaining children visited other, so-called comprehensive schools that essentially follow the same
structure without separating the children.
At the time of entering the survey population, the young adults —ages 16 to 17 years— are in the
midst of deciding upon a professional education according to their track. Students completing lower or
intermediary tracks have the opportunity to apply for and to start a profession-specific apprenticeship
or a vocational education.11 Although investing directly in an apprenticeship is the dominant path, the
young adults can alternatively enroll in a consecutive school-track that leads to the university entrance
9With the exceptions of Berlin and Brandenburg, which track after grade 6 (ages 11 to 13 years).
10The binding nature of these recommendations varies across states.
11Students who started an apprenticeship before entering the survey population are excluded from our analyses.
However, in 2011, only 10.6% started an apprenticeship before the age of 17 years (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013, p17).
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qualification (German: Abitur), an equivalent of a high school degree.12 This high school degree can
also be a valuable asset for students who do not want to attend an university. When applying for
highly competitive apprenticeship positions, students with a high school degree typically have better
chances compared to their peers who completed a lower track. Some apprenticeship positions are even
exclusively available to such students. In 2010, 20.9% of the newly signed apprenticeship contracts
went to students holding a high school degree (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011, p1004). Thus, we model
this path separately and refer to it as tertiary apprenticeship.
The decision to start an apprenticeship is somewhat different for students already enrolled in
high school. In principle, they can also drop out to start an apprenticeship or continue their high
school education and after finishing go on to university or a tertiary apprenticeship.13 Yet, their
default choice is certainly different as they are already enrolled in high school and they do not have
to make an active choice to enroll.14 In sum, 4% of the class of 2011 dropped out without a degree,
17% completed the lower track, 36% the intermediary track, and 43% obtained a high school degree
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013, p7). As a final remark, it is important to realize that in Germany, an
apprenticeship degree has a high standing and a reputation similar to a university degree —especially
when acquired after completing high school.
Summing up, in the subsequent analysis we distinguish between the four most commonly taken
education paths in Germany, which we index by j. The student can choose to drop out (j = 0), invest
in an apprenticeship directly after completing either the lower or intermediate school track (j = 1),
or continue schooling in high school. After completing high school, the student can decide whether to
invest in an apprenticeship (j = 2) or continue to university studies (j = 3).
Data sources
Our primary data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel [SOEP]. We focus on young adults,
ages 16 to 17 years, who have newly entered the survey population by answering the youth question-
naire between 2000 and 2013. The SOEP is a household panel that provides a rich set of parental
background information. We use all available waves of data collection to follow the young adults over
time up to 14 years. Additionally, we combine the individual-level data with regional labor market in-
formation and educational supply and demand measures based on 96 geographic regions, which we will
12Due to the limited time horizon of our sample we focus on early investment. The possibility of visiting complementary
courses that allow students to go to university after apprenticeship completion is not modeled separately. We discuss
the implications of this for the interpretation of our results below.
13Additionally, students could also drop out after completing high school, but this rarely occurs in practice (see also
Fossen and Glocker, 2014). Note that here university subsumes universities of applied sciences. While it would be
interesting to consider those separately, we have to leave this to future research due to our current sample size.
14We, therefore, include the indicator variable “In high school with 17” in all regressions. We also estimated the
regressions of our main Table 3 separately —fully saturated in this variable— for the two groups and present the results
in Appendix Table A6.
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refer to as Ror (for their German name Raumordnungsregionen).15 All regional information is matched
according to the individual’s residency when answering the youth questionnaire, and lagged by one
year to avoid endogeneity or reverse causality. Unless stated otherwise, we only use variables assessed
in the youth questionnaire to avoid any biases from conditioning on outcomes (Angrist and Pischke,
2009, p64f).16
Sample selection
As stated above, we exclude all individuals who have already started an apprenticeship. Moreover,
we exclude students with missing information in the core variables: subjective belief, GPA, and educa-
tional status. All other missing information are included along with corresponding indicator variables
for missing observations. This selection results in a sample size of 3,610 individual observations. In
the longitudinal analysis, we additionally require at least 2 years of information to assess the end of
secondary education and the start of a post-secondary education (reducing the observations to 2,116),
and to assess educational completion, we restrict the sample to students who responded for at least 5
years of data collection (1,372).17
Descriptive statistics
Our main variable of interest is the subjective completion belief, pi, that was assessed by the
following question:
Think about your future in your job and private life: how probable is it, in your opinion,
that the following events will occur?
[Please check off a probability on the scale from 0% to 100%.]
You successfully finish your vocational training or university studies?18
There are two caveats about how the question is assessed. First, the question is only elicited once.
Second, the question does not elicit beliefs for every possible counterfactual education. We discuss
the implications of these issues later in the estimation results. For now, we focus on the role of initial
beliefs in the combined effect of any post-secondary education. In this way, the question directly relates
to the outcomes that we assess. In Figure 2, we plot histograms of the subjective beliefs by students’
intentions to invest in education. Intention to invest is a self-reported measure of educational aspiration
15A map of the Ror’s is provided in Appendix A, Figure A1. The data source is INKAR 2012 provided by the German
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR, 2013). For more information,
see Pinger (2015) who also uses this additional data source. Moreover, we add the number of universities (higher learning
institutions) as a proxy for distance to university provided by the statistical agency of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt).
16We develop a structural model below in order to account for sequential decision-taking and to avoid associated biases.
17More information on missing values and the construction of the variables can be found in the Appendix, Table A7.
18Students could answer on an eleven point scale. The exact wording in German is:
Wenn Sie sich einmal Ihre berufliche und private Zukunft vorstellen: Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass die folgenden
Entwicklungen eintreten werden? [Stufen Sie bitte jeweils die Wahrscheinlichkeit auf einer Skala ein, die von 0 Prozent
bis 100 Prozent geht.] Ihre Ausbildung oder Ihr Studium erfolgreich abschließen?
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that asks students to indicate which further educational degree (if any) they plan to complete. It is
constructed analogously to our outcome variable: 0 refers to no further educational aspiration; 1, to
apprenticeship; 2, to tertiary apprenticeship (high school and apprenticeship); and 3, to university
studies.19
— — — Figure 2 about here — — —
Overall, the German students appear to be confident about finishing a post-secondary education,
as most of the adolescents report a probability above 50%. The distributions of students implicitly
aspiring to a high school degree (implied either by tertiary apprenticeship or university, Panels C and
D) are very similar in shape. Yet, the subjective beliefs of young adults who aspire to a university
degree are more concentrated and slightly shifted to the right compared to their high school counter-
parts who aim for a tertiary apprenticeship position. The mode of the distribution of students who
intend to start an apprenticeship without finishing high school lies at 100%. Finally, students with no
educational aspiration display a much larger spread in their beliefs. In what follows, it is important
to keep in mind that most variation —and the bulk of the students beliefs— are located between 60
and 100%.
Analogously, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by aspiration level for our baseline sample.20
— — — Table 1 about here — — —
At the bottom of the table, we present the sample shares of the intentions to invest: Most students
want to complete an apprenticeship, followed by university studies. A substantial share wants to
complete a high school education and an apprenticeship (tertiary apprenticeship), and roughly 10%
do not aspire to any professional education. It is reassuring that the sample statistics are broadly
consistent with the population statistics presented above (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013).
The individuals who aspire to a university education are on average the most confident about
successfully completing their post-secondary education, and have the lowest standard deviation. How-
ever, all young adults who have any educational aspirations exhibit a similar level of completion beliefs
—which are close to 80%— as opposed to those without educational aspirations. The fact that all
students have positive beliefs, even the ones who do not plan to invest in further training or education,
can be rationalized in a simple expected utility framework where students weight their utility from
19That means that, for consistency with our outcome variables, students who want to enroll in an apprenticeship
first and then continue with supplementary courses that prepare for university are subsumed into the apprenticeship
category. Moreover, we also cannot distinguish in detail between students who first want to complete an apprenticeship
and then a high school degree, without aiming to go university. However, this path is neither optimal from a human
capital investment perspective nor one that is commonly taken in Germany.
20More information on the construction of the variables can be found in the table notes. Unconditional descriptive
statistics for the various subsamples considered in the analysis below are presented in the Appendix, Table A1.
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education by their beliefs about their completion probabilities and report their aspirations based on
their highest expected utility. This is also the interpretation we pursue in the following analysis.
Some interesting patterns emerge when relating educational aspirations to our three measures of
academic ability: Aspirations are increasing in the grade point average [GPA].21 Prior track recom-
mendations at the age of 10 years seem to be a good indicator for the aspirations up to 7 years
later, which could either be caused by a well-working ability streaming or a manifestation of students’
expectations as a result of early-tracking. Interestingly, having no educational aspirations occurs in
all tracks, and the largest share of students without aspirations is found in high school. This could
be explained by a default effect, as the survey elicits these aspirations at a time when students not
enrolled in high school have to make an active decision as opposed to their high school counterparts
who can follow their track and decide after obtaining a high school degree.
We assess the adolescents’ personality by locus of control, risk attitudes, and the Big Five person-
ality inventory.22 Educational aspirations are positively associated with the locus of control, which
measures to what extent a person believes her life is under her own control. Among the standard Big
Five inventory, aspirations increase with openness, agreeableness, and extraversion but they are less
monotonically related to conscientiousness or neuroticism. Unconditionally, aspiring to a university
degree is positively associated with risk attitudes.
Individuals’ characteristics and family backgrounds are captured by their gender, number of sib-
lings, whether they are second-generation immigrants (persons whose parents were both born in a
foreign country), whether at least one parent has a college education, is currently unemployed, and
the logarithm of the net household income. Aspirations tend to be higher among males, children
from smaller families, natives, persons with employed and college-educated parents or with a higher
household income.
The regional labor and education market (Ror) characteristics relevant for the students’ choices
set are a mix of (exogenous) educational supply and demand shifters. We use the cyclical component
of the youth unemployment rate, and the number of apprenticeship positions, students, high school
graduates, and universities in the region. Throughout, the aspirations are increasing with the local
labor and education market characteristics as expected; only children with no educational aspirations
21The GPA refers to the student’s average of the German and Math grade, which is standardized over the sample
population we present in our main results from Table 3. We also standardize the GPA within school track in Appendix
Table A4 to show that the choice of standardization does not drive the results. We further standardize GPA within
federal states to show that different grading levels do not affect the results, see Appendix Table A5.
22We standardize all the principal components of the personality variables (all but risk attitudes, which are assessed
by one question only), small deviations from (0,1) result from the missing values which do not enter the standardization
but are set to 0 afterwards. The locus of control has been developed by Rotter (1966), the Big Five inventory by
Costa and McCrae (1992) and validated in the SOEP version by Hahn, Gottschling and Spinath (2012). Risk attitudes
have been introduced and extensively studied by Dohmen et al. (2011) and references therein.
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tend to have no clear ordering. In the following analysis, we will also account for region and year of
first questioning (which is roughly identical to students’ age).23
3 Determinants of subjective completion beliefs
To analyze how the variables we discussed in the previous section relate to subjective completion
beliefs, we estimate OLS regressions of the model
pi = x
′
iβ
p + υi, (1)
where i indexes individuals, pi is the subjective completion belief, xi are varying sets of explanatory
variables with corresponding vector of coefficients βp, and υi is an unobserved error term.
The estimates are presented in Table 2.24 In Column (1), the beliefs are explained solely by
academic ability. In Column (2), we add the personality measures; in Column (3), individual and
family and individual background characteristics; and, finally, in Column (4), regional measures, year
and region fixed effects.
— — — Table 2 about here — — —
The explained variation, as measured by the adjusted R2, increases substantially only when aca-
demic ability and personality measures are included, but stays relatively unaffected when adding
individual and family characteristics, or fixed effects and regional characteristics. The joint signifi-
cance tests for subsets of variables reported at the bottom panel of the table give analogous results:
Academic ability and personality characteristics are highly significant across all regressions; individual
and family characteristics are jointly significant; labor market characteristics, regional and time effects
are not. Since the labor market coefficient estimates are neither jointly nor individually significant,
we omitted these estimates from the table.
Looking at the determinants individually, all academic ability variables are consistently positive
and significant. Somewhat surprisingly, already being enrolled in high school does not alter students’
subjective completion beliefs. This might be due to this effect being conditional on track recom-
mendation. As hypothesized by Coleman and DeLeire (2003), the locus of control is a very important
23For some of the regressions, the number of students within a state is too small. To obtain consistent samples,
we use a broader grouping by dividing Germany into the following 5 regions (and an indicator for missing values).
Southern Germany: Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria; Eastern Germany: Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt,
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; Central Germany: Hesse, Thuringia; Western Germany: North Rhine-Westphalia,
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland; Northern Germany: Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein. We present
analogous results of our main Table 3 in Appendix Table A4 were we use federal states fixed effects, as the jurisdiction
over educational policies are on the federal state level. The results are qualitatively the same.
24Note that our dependent variable is a fraction. In the Appendix, Table A2, we present fractional response regressions
(as in Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008). The results are virtually indistinguishable from the OLS estimates.
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determinant of subjective completion beliefs throughout the regressions, both in magnitude and signif-
icance.25 Risk attitudes do not matter once family characteristics are accounted for. Our regressions
indicate that among the Big Five measures of personality, conscientiousness is the most influential in
shaping subjective beliefs. This finding highlights the importance of conscientiousness for educational
outcomes, as is consistently found in the literature (see, inter alia, Borghans, Meijers and Ter Weel,
2006). While we find little evidence that openness or neuroticism influence completion beliefs, extraver-
sion has a coefficient which is about half as large as conscientiousness, and the effect of agreeableness
is about half as large as extraversion.
On average, females seem to have lower subjective completion beliefs. This estimate is, however,
only marginally significant (at least conditional on personality and academic ability). Household in-
come is positively and significantly related to subjective completion beliefs. Being a second-generation
immigrant is significantly negatively associated with subjective beliefs. However, the significance van-
ishes after including regional determinants. This suggests a segregation effect, with immigrants being
located in less economically and educationally active areas. The other covariates are insignificant and
mostly very small in magnitude.
4 Subjective completion beliefs and educational outcomes
In this section, we turn to our central question of how subjective completion beliefs measured at
age 17 years relate to intended investments in education, actual investments in education, and, finally,
educational degree attainment. To fix ideas, let the individual i’s utility uij from choosing an uncertain
post-secondary educational track (j ≥ 1) be
uij =


µij + εij with probability pij
µ¯ij + εij with probability (1− pij)
, (2)
where pij is the subjective completion belief, µij (µ¯ij) is the utility from (not) completing, and εij is
an utility component unaffected by completion. The associated expected utility is
Uij = pijµij + (1− pij)µ¯ij + εij (3)
= µ¯ij + pij(µij − µ¯ij) + εij .
25Caliendo, Cobb-Clark and Uhlendorff (2015) also find a strong link between subjective beliefs and the locus of control
in the realm of job search among the unemployed.
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Hence, adolescents get a baseline utility from attending a particular educational track µ¯ij. The
subjective completion belief pij weights the utility differential between completing and not completing
an educational track either up or down. Since not investing in an educational track does not involve
educational uncertainty, its utility is simply
Ui0 = µi0 + εi0, with certainty. (4)
In this section, we assess the investment in any post-secondary education Uij = Ui for j ≥ 1,
against not investing Ui0. The subjective belief pi therefore corresponds directly to the question in
the survey. A student prefers to invest in education if Ui > Ui0; where, by standard normalization,
µi0 = 0. Taking averages across individuals, adding covariates xi that measure observed preferences
and skills, and assuming that νi = εi − εi0 follows a standard normal distribution, we estimate probit
models of the form
di = 1[αpi + x
′
iβ
d + νi > 0]. (5)
We consider three binary outcomes di. First, whether a student intends to invest in any further
education, which is measured concurrently with subjective beliefs at age 17 years. Second, whether a
student actually invests in any further education; that is, whether the student started an apprenticeship
or, tertiary apprenticeship, or enrolled in a university. This event can be a few months or a few years
away. Third, whether a student completes an apprenticeship or university degree, an event that is at
least a couple of years away.
When di stands for the intention to invest, the expectation of (5) gives P (Ui > 0), so that α = µ−µ¯.
A similar interpretation is possible when di represents the second outcome. It then corresponds to the
revealed preferences of actual investment in post-secondary education. The interpretation is somewhat
different when di stands for the third outcome, the completion of a degree. In this case, α gives an
indication of the student’s ability to incorporate information beyond that in xi into their forecast of
di = 1. Here, we interpret the subjective beliefs in a similar vein as Finkelstein and McGarry (2006).
The adolescents process all their available information in forming their beliefs, meaning that relevant
information over and above their subjective beliefs are either not used, not used efficiently, or influence
the decision through another channel than subjective completion uncertainty.
— — — Table 3 about here — — —
Table 3 contains the estimation results. Vertical panels (A) to (E) present the probit regressions of
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the subjective completion beliefs on the different educational outcomes. In each panel, we report the
estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses), average marginal effects (in squared
brackets), pseudo R2n for the model estimated with and without pi, and sample statistics for the
respective subsamples. Columns (1) to (4) contain the simple probit estimates of the educational
outcomes on the subjective beliefs and varying sets of covariates: The specification in Column (1)
contains, apart from pi, only an indicator of whether the student is currently in high school, region
and year fixed effects. Thus, in this specification, any other variable acts on the intention to invest
in education through its effect on pi. The next columns progressively control for the sets of academic
(Column 2), personality (Column 3), and family and labor market variables (Column 4). We turn to
the results in Columns (5)-(8) at the end of this section.
Panel (A) contains results corresponding to the intention to invest in any post-secondary education.
Unsurprisingly, uncertainty appears to be important for aspirations: The coefficients on subjective
beliefs are large and highly significant throughout the probit regressions. The average marginal effects
are economically relevant. In the most parsimonious specification, increasing the subjective beliefs in
the population by one standard deviation increases intentions to invest in post-secondary education
by 2.7 percentage points (0.14 × 0.198), which is very large given that only 9.2% of students do not
intend to invest in a post-secondary education. This changes little if we condition on increasing sets of
background characteristics commonly considered in the literature. A one standard deviation change
results in an increase of 2.1 percentage points using all background characteristics. Moreover, the
increase in the pseudo R2 when including the subjective beliefs is similar to the increase when adding
both personality and family background. Thus, we find subjective beliefs are strongly related to
intended behavior, a result consistent with Huntington-Klein (2015b).
Several explanations can account for this observed correlation between beliefs and aspirations;
therefore, we examine whether the link from beliefs to intention carries over to revealed preferences in
actual investments (at least two years later). Our dependent variable is now an indicator that equals
one if the student started any post-secondary education. Panel (B) uses the broadest sample possible
for this question. Compared to (A), it only excludes students who are still in school and students
who have not completed any subsequent questionnaires two years after the baseline questionnaire
at age 17. The average marginal effect is somewhat smaller than for the intentions, ranging from
1.4 to 0.9 percentage points for one standard deviation increase in the subjective beliefs.26 In Panel
(C), we show that similar results are obtained when restricting the sample to students who expressed
26Almost all adolescents in Germany start some post-secondary education, 95.6% in our sample, which explains why
the average marginal effect for investment is smaller than that for intentions despite an estimated coefficient of similar
magnitude.
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earlier intentions to invest in post-secondary education. This shows that the subjective completion
belief drives not only hypothetical, intended investment, but it also has real behavioral consequences.
Compared to the previous results on students’ intentions-to-invest, the set of family background and
labor market variables explain a larger fraction of the completion belief effect and exhibit a substantial
explanatory power.
It is interesting to compare how the subjective completion beliefs relate to actual completion (at
least five years later). This can be interpreted as how well the students can predict their future
outcomes.27 The estimation results are given in Panels (D) and (E). The average completion rate is
roughly 55%. Unconditionally, a one standard deviation increase in the subjective beliefs increases
completion rates in the population by 3.3 percentage points in the overall sample (Panel D), and
by 3.6 when conditioning on the sample with positive intentions (Panel E). This decreases to 2.6
and 3.3 percentage points, respectively, when including the full set of individual, family, and regional
characteristics. Comparing the coefficients across rows, a notable result is that for degree completion,
the set of covariates that affect the coefficient of pi most is that of the personality measures. Including
these variables reduces the estimated coefficient by about 15 to 20 percent. The explanatory power of
personality, family background, and labor market characteristics are substantial. This suggests that
the students do not optimally account for this information when forming their beliefs. Again, the
explanatory power of the beliefs is substantial.
Taken together, the results show that subjective completion beliefs formed during secondary ed-
ucation are predictive over a long time horizon for future post-secondary education. The subjective
beliefs are predictive even after accounting for a large set of previously identified, important charac-
teristics. In the appendix, we present further results showing the robustness of these findings across
a number of alternative specifications. We show that the results are robust to dichotomizing the
subjective beliefs to a dummy variable, thus accounting for potential non-linearity as discussed in
Pinger (2015). Further, since academic ability is found to be the main determinant of learning about
one’s own ability in the literature, we use various reasonable standardizations of GPA that account for
potential differences in grading across federal states, or within high school versus no high school. We
also use a fifth-order polynomial to show that the beliefs do not pick up non-linearities in academic
ability. Additionally, we use federal state dummies instead of the region dummies used in the main
27Since completing a program and graduating takes some time, we only consider students which we see at least five
years after they have taken the youth questionnaire when they indicated their completion beliefs. This further reduces
our available sample. Moreover, it is clear that students who were interviewed in earlier years are more likely to have
completed their degrees simply by virtue of being in the sample for a longer period of time. However, this mechanism
is captured by the year fixed effects, and is therefore unlikely to bias our results. A second concern is that some of the
observations are censored: As of the time we observe them, some students have not yet completed their degree, but they
might do so in the future. In this sense, our results should be interpreted as representing the average effect of completion
beliefs on completion within a given time frame.
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specification (cf. footnote 23). Finally, we present separate estimations for students enrolled in high
school when answering the youth questionnaire to account for the different default choices discussed
above in a completely flexible way.
A remaining concern might be that the uncertainty is confounded with unobserved heterogeneity.
We therefore use a bounding strategy for the coefficients by taking potential selection on unobservable
tastes and preferences for education into account when estimating (5). We use the approach developed
by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005a,b, 2008, hereafter, AET). More specifically, we simultaneously
estimate the models given in (1) and (5), imposing the following dependence between the error terms:
(νi, υi) ∼ Φ2(0, 0, 1, 1, ρ), (6)
where Φ2(·) denotes the bivariate normal distribution, and its arguments are the two errors’ means,
variances, and their correlation. In other words, we estimate probit models for all outcomes di with
pi as a normal endogenous explanatory variable [denoted probit eev hereafter].
28,29 The bounding
is achieved by setting the correlation coefficient ρ to increasing values until the coefficient of the
subjective beliefs α tends to zero. Note that Column (4) in combination with Table 2’s Column (4) is
equivalent to the probit eev with ρ = 0. AET argue that the selection-on-observables is a reasonable
(upper) bound on the selection-on-unobservables. Therefore, we also estimate the model replacing
ρ =
cov(x′iβ
d, x′iβ
p)
var(x′iβ
d)
≡ ρˆo
as a suggestive upper bound. Columns (5) to (7) contain the probit eev estimates using the full set of
covariates and ρ constrained to 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5. Finally, Column (8) constrains ρ to be equal to the
selection-on-observables ρˆo. Up to a correlation of 0.3 all coefficients are positive, and for aspirations
and intentions they remain statistically significant. This is a sizeable correlation when comparing it
to the applications considered in AET. When using the AET bound of selection-on-observables in the
last column, the coefficients are all statistically significant and similar in magnitude to those using all
covariates and a correlation between 0 and 0.1. This indicates that the results are robust to a sizeable
28The corresponding log-likelihood is given by
lnL(di, pi;xi, α, β
d
, β
p
, ρ) =
n∑
i=1
lnΦ
[
(2di − 1)
(
x′iβ
d + αpi + ρ(pi − x
′
iβ
p)√
1− ρ2
)]
+ lnφ
(
pi − x
′
iβ
p
)
. (7)
For more information, see the discussion in Greene (2012, p747f).
29In contrast to AET, our main variable is a fraction rather than an indicator. Instead of estimating a bivariate
probit, we therefore estimate a probit eev. The use of a continuous normal variable is motivated by the estimation of
(1), where we found that it made little difference whether it was estimated by OLS or a fractional response model (cf.
Appendix Table A2). As a robustness check we dichotomize the subjective beliefs at p ≥ 70% and estimate bivariate
probit regressions as in AET. Estimates for such an approach can be found in the Appendix Table A3. The results are
similar but somewhat more conservative, possibly due to the reduced variation.
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selection-on-unobservables.
The results presented in this section indicate that the uncertainty of 17-year-old students about
completing an educational degree is an important determinant of educational choices and outcomes.
While we focused our discussion on the average effect, another effect which is of interest is the one
corresponding to the marginal student (a student with an outcome probability of 50%). An increase
in the subjective belief by one standard deviation (0.2) for this student would: increase her intention
to invest by 5.7 percentage points (i.e., Φ(0.2×0.716)−Φ(0)), her investment by 6.9 percentage points
(5.8 if she stated an intention to invest), and her completion by 2.6 percentage points (3.4 if she stated
an intention to invest). In sum, differences in beliefs about being capable of successfully finishing
a post-secondary educational degree can explain not only differences in intended future investments
in schooling, but in actual investments as represented by enrollment into university or obtaining an
apprenticeship position. Moreover, students with higher subjective beliefs are also associated with
higher completion rates, even after controlling for several potential confounders and allowing for some
selection-on-unobservables.
5 A view at the disaggregated level
To understand how subjective beliefs influence educational choices and outcomes, we proceed with a
more disaggregated analysis: different educational choices. In the estimations before, we implicitly
assumed the subjective belief measure has the same effect on all educational investments. Clearly,
while this is a useful simplification that allows to gauge overall average effects, it might also hide
important differences in how completion beliefs explain, say, enrollment in a university program versus
enrollment in a vocational training degree. In this section, we separately asses each of the three
educational investments: apprenticeship (j = 1), tertiary apprenticeship (j = 2), and university
(j = 3). Compared to the previous sections, in which the subjective belief measure corresponded
directly to the outcome, for the disaggregated educational tracks one would ideally like to assess
the role of counterfactual choices. Unfortunately, these were not asked in the survey. Therefore, we
condition on students’ aspirations; however, results have to be interpreted more cautiously.
As before, the analysis starts at the level of intended investment. This time we present results
from a multinomial probit model with four outcomes. The base category is not having any intention
to invest, and the remaining categories are the intention to invest in each of the three educational
choices mentioned above. The results are presented in Table 4, whose four columns represent speci-
fications with the increasing sets of covariates discussed previously. We present the χ2-statistic and
corresponding p-value for the likelihood ratio test against a restricted model without subjective beliefs.
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— — — Table 4 about here — — —
All coefficients are statistically significant and large in magnitude. The first column shows that the
overall average marginal effect of subjective beliefs (in squared brackets) found before stems almost
exclusively from the fact that students with higher completion beliefs aspire to a university education.
Notice that the sum of the three average marginal effects is roughly equal to the corresponding effect
presented in the previous section.30
Yet, the second column shows that academic variables, such as GPA, are central in shaping this
effect. Once the academic background has been accounted for, the effect of subjective belief works
mainly through the apprenticeship channel. The average marginal effect for university is reduced
substantially and rendered statistically insignificant. Thus, high GPA has the effect of inducing high
completion beliefs, which in turn pushes students towards desiring a university degree. But within a
given GPA level, a higher completion belief is positively associated with starting an apprenticeship.
Compared to this big shift, the changes resulting from adding personality, family background, and
labor market variables are modest (at least beyond its effect through GPA or personality skills). This
result is in line with those found in the literature that for college students most of the information
is based on measures of academic ability (Milla, 2014; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012, 2014b;
Zafar, 2011b). Yet, for those who choose a less theoretical education, other characteristics seem to be
more influential.
Turning to the behavioral responses, we estimate separate regressions for the three subsamples
according to intended educational choice. That is, we address the question, for example, of how
does a higher subjective completion belief increase a student’s university enrollment and completion
probabilities, given that the student aspired to a university degree. Estimates are reported in Table 5.
Columns (1) to (4) display the results for enrollment and (5) to (8) for completion. The three vertical
Panels (A) to (C) contain separate probit regressions of each educational track.
— — — Table 5 about here — — —
Panel (A) reports the estimates for investment and completion of an apprenticeship. The results
indicate that the effects of subjective beliefs are indeed large and statistically significant, with the
average marginal effect ranging from about 10 to 15 percentage points, depending on the set of control
variables used. With 883 observations, the subsample with intended investment in apprenticeship is
the largest of the three subsamples, accounting for almost half of the total number of observations.
The subsample for intended tertiary apprenticeship has only 456 observations. In three out of the
30We omit the average marginal effect for the base category: it is equal to minus the sum of the marginal effects of
the remaining categories.
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four specifications shown in the middle panel, the estimated coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient
—and hence the marginal effect— increases as more covariates are controlled for, and only reaches
marginal significance in the last column of the panel. The bottom panel, containing the results of the
subsample aspiring to a university education, features the opposite pattern. Here, completion beliefs
have a large, statistically significant effect on enrollment in university. However, academic background
explains almost half of the effect. Adding more sets of control variables further erodes the effect of
subjective beliefs on college enrollment.
Comparing the results across the three panels, it appears that the decision to enroll in a post-
secondary educational program is related most strongly to subjective completion beliefs for those
students aspiring to a university degree (see columns 1 across panels). At the same time, the de-
terminants of these beliefs are mainly related to observable academic and demographic variables for
the university-aspiring students. For the two apprenticeship streams, the observable academic and
demographics add comparatively little information to the completion beliefs. Moreover, for the ter-
tiary apprenticeship, there even seems to be a negative correlation with these characteristics, but the
estimation results are too imprecise to allow for further interpretation.
To conclude this part, we estimate analogous probit regressions for the probability to graduate.
The results are depicted in the right-hand-side panel of Table 5. Small sample size issues are a
concern, especially for the tertiary apprenticeship graduation regressions. However, the estimates are
consistent with our previous results. In particular, the aggregate effect found in the previous section
is corroborated in the apprenticeship category. For students who indicated their intentions to invest
in an apprenticeship degree at age 17 years, the subjective completion beliefs are highly informative
about their actual completion years later. The average marginal effect is close to 30 percentage points
—a figure that is reduced to about 20 percentage points after accounting for differences in observables.
We cannot estimate precise effects for tertiary apprenticeships. While the point estimates are sizeable,
none of them are statistically significant. The results for students aspiring to a university education
also echo the previous results. The effect of the completion beliefs at age 17 years is large and
statistically significant: a one-standard-deviation change in pi increases the probability of graduating
from university by about 6 percentage points for a student with a baseline graduation probability of
50 percent. Finally (and as before), the available control variables, particularly academic background
variables, explain a large portion of this effect.
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6 A dynamic model of educational choice
In this section, we conclude our investigation by developing and estimating a model of educational in-
vestment along the lines of Taber’s (2001) seminal contribution that encompasses three features. First,
we allow for the sequential nature of the process: students can only decide whether they want to go to
university if they chose to finish high school previously (Altonji, 1993; Comay, Melnik and Pollatschek,
1973). Second, we introduce the dynamics of the optimization process: when deciding whether to go
to the labor market or to go to high school, forward-looking students account for the option value of
continuing education after finishing high school (Stange, 2012; Trachter, 2015). Finally, we allow for
unobserved factors that influence student utilities derived from their choices, which may be correlated
across choices and over time, a topic of substantial attention in the returns to education literature
(see, e.g., Belzil, 2007; Card, 2001, and references therein).
Model
We consider a stylized two-period model in which students sequentially choose between risky
educational paths, as outlined in Figure 3.
— — — Figure 3 about here — — —
Ex ante, students do not know for certain whether they will successfully complete the chosen
education track, but they have subjective beliefs, pi, about finishing. The first period or first stage
(T = 1) occurs when students finish compulsory education at the age of 17 years. At this point,
they face the choice between dropping out of school (di1 = 0), investing in an apprenticeship training
(di1 = 1), or continuing with high school education (di1 = 2). A high school degree involves the option
value of continuing with tertiary education. Students who choose high school reach the second period
(T = 2), where they graduate from high school and now have the choice of either investing in a tertiary
apprenticeship (di1 = 2, di2 = 0) or in a university education (di1 = 2, di2 = 1).
31,32
As mentioned in Section 4, apprenticeships, tertiary apprenticeships, and university all involve
uncertainty, which we model according to equations (2)-(4). A key assumption of this approach is
that utility can be decomposed into a component that depends on the realization of graduation (µij for
graduation vs. µ¯ij else) and an idiosyncratic component unaffected by graduation, εij , which captures
features such as a preference for attending, say, university irrespective of receiving a degree.
By backward induction, we begin with the students’ second stage problem. Students advancing
31As noted before, students could also drop out at this point, but this is an extremely rare event in the data and
therefore not modeled (see also Fossen and Glocker, 2014).
32We only focus on the initial beliefs in shaping young adults’ educational choices because we lack a repeated mea-
surement of the subjective beliefs at the end of high school that would allow us to study the learning about ones’ own
ability in more detail.
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to the second stage choose between starting a tertiary apprenticeship (j = 2) or going to university
(j = 3). We denote this choice by di2, a binary variable where 1 represents choosing university,
di2 =


1 if Ui3 − Ui2 > 0
0 if Ui3 − Ui2 ≤ 0
which we specify analogously to equation (4) by
Ui3 − Ui2 = α3pi + x
′
i,t+1β3 + δ3θi + νi3 ≡ zi3,t+1 + νi3.
Here, α3 = (µ3 − µ2)− (µ¯3 − µ¯2), νi3 = εi3 − εi2, and xi,t+1 consists of the same covariates considered
above, although we include time-varying labor market conditions measured two years after answering
the youth questionnaire, which is the time one would need to start a higher education after obtaining
a high school degree.33 This exogenous variation in the decision problem induced by the timing of
the events provides an additional source of identification (see, French and Taber, 2011; Taber, 2000,
for a discussion on the identification for these models), which has become standard practice in the
literature on dynamic models of educational choice (e.g., Heckman et al., 2014; Taber, 2001). To allow
for dependence of the unobservables between the two time periods in a flexible way, we add a standard
normal random variable θi to the utilities, capturing unobserved tastes and preferences for education.
We assume that νi3 ∼ N(0, σ3), thus the probability of choosing university is given by
P (di2 = 1) = Φ
(
zi3,t+1
σ3
)
,
where Φ(·) represents the univariate normal cdf.
In the first stage, the student has an expectation about her second stage decision (she knows the
distribution of νi3) but does not know her realized value. If students knew their realized νi3 at the
time of the first stage, the model would reduce to a simple static polychotomous choice problem,
similar to those estimated and reported in Table 4. Thus, the students’ expectation about her value
of advancing to the second stage, as formed during the first stage, is
E(max(Ui3 − Ui2, 0)) = σ3
[
Φ
(
zi3,t
σ3
)
zi3,t
σ3
+ φ
(
zi3,t
σ3
)]
≡ EVi,
and φ(·) denotes the normal pdf. Now the labor market and educational supply and demand char-
acteristics are measured at time t, one year before the adolescent answers the youth questionnaire
33We use students’ location at the age of 17 for the region fixed effects, to avoid a bias due to moving.
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corresponding to her information set. The difference between high school and drop out utility is then
UiHS − Ui0 = α2pi + x
′
i,tβ2 + δ2θi + EVi + νiHS
≡ ziHS,t + νiHS ,
which comprises EVi, the option value of continuing to the second stage. In these types of models,
we cannot distinguish between the baseline utility of the second stage tertiary apprenticeship and
the utility of high school. The coefficients α2, β2, δ2 thus capture the sum of these two effects (while
the coefficients in zi3,t correspond to the differences between preferences for university and tertiary
apprenticeship).
The apprenticeship utility is
Ui1 − Ui0 = α1pi + x
′
i,tβ1 + θi + νi1 ≡ zi1,t + νi1,
where we set δ1 = 1, a necessary normalization to identify the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, θi,
on latent utilities. By the bivariate normal assumption on the ν’s we can write the probabilities
P (di1 = 2) = Φ2 (ziHS,t, ziHS,t − zi1,t, 0.5) ,
P (di1 = 1) = Φ2 (zi1,t, zi1,t − ziHS,t, 0.5) ,
P (di1 = 0) = 1− P (di1 = 1)− P (di1 = 2).
The individual likelihood contribution, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity θi, is given by
li(θi) = {1− P (di1 = 1)− P (di1 = 2)}
1(di1=0) × {P (di1 = 1)}
1(di1=1)
× {P (di1 = 2)[1 − P (di2 = 1)]}
1(di1=2,di2=0) (8)
× {P (di1 = 2)P (di2 = 1)}
1(di1=2,di2=1) ,
and to obtain the marginal likelihood contribution, we integrate over the distribution of θ,
li =
∫
li(θi)φ(θi)dθi,
an expression which we approximate by simulation, l˜i, by taking random draws from the distribution
of θi. We then maximize the simulated sample log-likelihood
∑
i ln l˜i.
Results
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The estimation results are depicted in Table 6 in two panels. The left-hand-side panel contains
estimates from a constrained version of the model without heterogeneity (θi = 0 for all i), whereas the
right-hand-side panel contains estimates from the full model with unobserved heterogeneity. Moving
from left to right, the columns again contain the expanding set of covariates considered previously.
With the exception of the local labor and education market characteristics, all the regressors are
time-invariant.34
— — — Table 6 about here — — —
Table 6 depicts large and significant estimates for the coefficients of the subjective probabilities
in the indices for both di1 =1 and di1 =2. Thus, these results, too, suggest that a higher pi pushes
students away from leaving school without further investments. In particular, the coefficients for di1=2
suggest that subjective completion beliefs are important determinants of second-stage participation; of
completing high school and beginning a tertiary apprenticeship or university studies (which confirms
and extends the results found by Pinger, 2015). On the other hand, the coefficients for university
are insignificant throughout, and close to zero when accounting for covariates. This indicates that,
once in the second stage, the initial subjective beliefs are not informative about the choice of tertiary
apprenticeship versus university. A potential explanation for this is belief updating in response to new
information revealed by high school grades.
— — — Figure 4 about here — — —
Figure 4 illustrates the role of the option value, EVi, in shaping the choice probabilities. The figure
uses predicted probabilities obtained from the estimated parameters in Column (5) and evaluated at
sample means. The left-hand-side panel artificially sets the expected value to zero; that is, we evaluate
a constrained model where students ignore the option value of further investment. Thus, we interpret
the coefficients from di1 = 2 as corresponding only to high school utility, and we assume students
neglect the option value of continuing to the second-stage choices. As expected, it can be seen by
contrasting the two panels in the figure that the option value decreases the level of the apprenticeship
probabilities and increases those of the second-stage choices. But the option value also affects how
the probabilities change with the subjective belief, making the gradient on apprenticeship flatter —
and even slightly negative for high values of pi— and the gradient on university steeper. Therefore,
the option value in conjunction with the subjective beliefs can play a substantial role in shaping the
34The estimate of σ3 is only identified when time-varying covariates are included (French and Taber, 2011; Taber,
2000). We present it therefore only in Columns (4) and (8).
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adolescents’ high school investment.35
We now turn to the role of the unobserved preferences for post-secondary education or unobserved
skills, θi. Comparing the two panels of Table 6, we see that all the significant coefficients in the
right-hand-side panel, which accounts for such heterogeneity, are somewhat larger than the ones from
the left-hand-side. Recall that θi has no natural scale, its scale has been fixed such that a unit
coefficient in the index corresponds to apprenticeship. The coefficient on the linear index for the
baseline second-stage utility is about 0.85 across all specifications (5)-(8) and highly significant. It
shows that there is a strong positive correlation between unobserved preferences for apprenticeship
and for high school. Unobserved preferences for education are very important for the adolescents
investment decisions, as found in the prior literature (e.g. Bulman, 2015; D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel,
2013; Huntington-Klein, 2015a; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a). Yet, there is no evidence for differences
between unobserved tertiary-apprenticeship-specific skills versus university-specific skills, with the
estimated coefficient being virtually zero, potentially a result of preference updating within high
school.
Figure 5 further uses the results from Table 6 to visualize how the effect of pi might differ for
different “types” of students.
— — — Figure 5 about here — — —
Based on the estimates of the full specification from Column (8), we define four types by their
academic ability level (high versus low GPA) and their unobserved skill level (high versus low θi) and
plot their predicted choice probabilities against pi, evaluated at sample means.
36 For students who have
high observed and unobserved skills, subjective completion beliefs have negligible effects on investment
probabilities. Yet, for adolescents with low unobserved skills (and high GPA), subjective beliefs
positively influence all educational tracks. For students with low academic performance, subjective
beliefs are more relevant if they have a low preference for education. It is also interesting to note that
high GPA (for given level of θi) has a much larger effect on investment than high unobserved skills
and preferences (for a given level of GPA). This suggests that the subjective beliefs are most relevant
for students with low unobserved skills.37
In sum, the results from the dynamic sequential model with unobserved heterogeneity shed light on
some aspects of educational choice which were masked in the reduced form models of Sections 4 and 5.
35The extent of these effects depends on the values of the covariates, which in Figure 4 were set to sample means. In
Figure A2 in the Appendix we present graphs where we set all the linear indices x′iβj = 0 and thus obtain effects which
are much stronger.
36Specifically, we define high and low values of GPA and θi as Φ
−1(0.75) and Φ−1(0.25).
37Figure A3 contains a similar graph to Figure 5, but evaluated at x′iβj = 0, thus yielding even more pronounced
effects.
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One such aspect is that the sequentiality of choices shows that pi has a highly significant effect on the
combined high school and second-stage choice; in contrast, it was difficult to estimate precise effects for
pi in the static reduced form model where all four choices were disaggregated. Furthermore, we have
seen that accounting for the option value and for unobserved skills can modify the effect of pi on the
choice probabilities. Speaking more broadly, the structural estimates confirm the main results from the
reduced-form estimations presented previously: subjective probabilities contain predictive information
for educational investments even after accounting for differences due to an extensive set of controls
and unobserved heterogeneity. Additionally, and consistent with the recent literature, throughout the
analysis GPA has been shown to be the main driver of subjective beliefs. Thus, learning about one’s
own ability is largely determined by school grades already before entering a post-secondary education.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the role of uncertainty for 17-year-olds on their post-secondary educa-
tional outcomes by means of subjective beliefs. Two features of this problem are the young age of the
students at the time their subjective completion probabilities were elicited and the long time horizon
of the choices to which these measures referred. Both features make this a difficult problem, and it
is remarkable that these necessarily crude initial beliefs retain their predictive power over a period
of several years. The effects of subjective beliefs on investment intentions and actual investments
in any post-secondary education are substantial, remaining so even after controlling for observables.
Moreover, subjective beliefs have explanatory power comparable to that of academic and personality
variables combined. For the marginal student, a one standard deviation increase in subjective beliefs
is associated with a 6 percentage points increase for investment intentions and a 7 percentage points
increase for actual enrollment. Finally, the subjective probabilities of completion are also predictive
of actual completion, increasing completion probability by 3 percentage points.
When disaggregating the educational tracks and estimating a structural choice model, we find
the subjective beliefs most relevant for students who aim for a university degree. This is due to the
information revealed by GPA, which broadly confirms results found in the literature. Most notably,
we confirm Zafar’s (2011b) finding that ex ante subjective beliefs continue to be important even until
the degree is completed. Advancing his findings, we conclude that this is even true for subjective
beliefs formed already in or before investing (or staying) in high school. Conditional on the academic
ability, the subjective beliefs are most relevant for students who start an apprenticeship, which is
largely driven by students with additionally low unobserved skills or preferences for post-secondary
education. The literature on subjective beliefs in educational choice has largely ignored these students
25
and evidence on their learning/decision-making processes are almost non-existent. Our study suggests
that these students deserve more attention.
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Figure 1: Simplification of the German education system
Source: Adaptation and extension of the overview provided by Wo¨lfel and Heineck (2012).
30
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
D
en
si
ty
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p (subjective completion belief)
(A) No intentions (N=331)
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
D
en
si
ty
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p (subjective completion belief)
(B) Apprenticeship (N=1’302)
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
D
en
si
ty
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p (subjective completion belief)
(C) Tertiary apprenticeship (N=826)
0.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
D
en
si
ty
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
p (subjective completion belief)
(D) University (N=1’151)
Figure 2: Subjective completion beliefs by intentions-to-invest
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, own calculations.
d1 = 2
d2 = 1
p
1− p
d2 = 0
p
1− p
d1 = 1
p
1− p
d1 = 0
T = 1 T = 2
Figure 3: Sequential education decisions and timing of events
31
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
p (subjective completion belief)
Without option value
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
p (subjective completion belief)
With option value
0 No investment 1 Apprenticeship
2 Tertiary apprent. 3 University
Figure 4: The role of the option value in a dynamic model of educational choice
Notes: Predicted probabilities constructed using estimates from Column (5) of Table 6 and evaluated at sample means.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
p
Low GPA, low θ
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
p
Low GPA, high θ
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
p
High GPA, low θ
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
p
High GPA, high θ
0 No investment 1 Apprenticeship
2 Tertiary apprent. 3 University
Figure 5: The role of academic ability and unobserved heterogeneity
Notes: Predicted probabilities constructed using estimates from Column (8) of Table 6, evaluated at sample means.
High GPA = High θ = Φ−1(0.75), Low GPA = Low θ = Φ−1(0.25).
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
32
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by educational aspirations
By aspiration level Total
Variables 0 1 2 3
p 0.692 0.768 0.782 0.805 0.776
(0.258) (0.220) (0.176) (0.155) (0.198)
GPA (std) -0.269 -0.288 -0.000 0.404 0.000
(1.035) (0.919) (0.902) (1.007) (1.000)
Rec: Lower Track (yes/no) 0.166 0.265 0.044 0.034 0.132
(0.373) (0.441) (0.204) (0.181) (0.338)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.248 0.351 0.271 0.150 0.259
(0.432) (0.477) (0.445) (0.358) (0.438)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.284 0.092 0.524 0.698 0.402
(0.452) (0.289) (0.500) (0.459) (0.490)
In high school (yes/no) 0.272 0.015 0.596 0.767 0.411
(0.446) (0.123) (0.491) (0.423) (0.492)
Locus of control (std) -0.178 -0.169 0.082 0.195 0.003
(1.014) (0.963) (0.861) (0.862) (0.928)
Risk attitudes (std) -0.057 -0.006 -0.037 0.053 0.001
(0.962) (0.945) (0.914) (0.895) (0.924)
Openness (std) -0.178 -0.134 0.048 0.167 -0.000
(0.990) (0.956) (0.879) (0.926) (0.942)
Agreeableness (std) -0.103 -0.048 0.068 0.042 0.002
(0.928) (0.987) (0.909) (0.919) (0.944)
Extraversion (std) -0.135 -0.051 0.021 0.075 -0.002
(0.948) (0.914) (0.919) (0.989) (0.945)
Neuroticism (std) 0.059 0.009 0.053 -0.066 -0.000
(0.942) (0.922) (0.885) (1.003) (0.943)
Conscientiousness (std) -0.132 0.053 -0.059 0.026 0.002
(0.967) (0.938) (0.915) (0.953) (0.942)
Female (yes/no) 0.486 0.454 0.541 0.539 0.504
(0.501) (0.498) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500)
Nr. of siblings 1.613 1.710 1.433 1.496 1.570
(1.461) (1.494) (1.206) (1.099) (1.316)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) 0.746 0.680 0.574 0.557 0.623
(0.436) (0.466) (0.495) (0.497) (0.485)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.199 0.101 0.306 0.495 0.283
(0.400) (0.301) (0.461) (0.500) (0.450)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) 0.124 0.160 0.087 0.045 0.103
(0.330) (0.367) (0.282) (0.208) (0.304)
Log. net household income 10.019 9.890 10.624 10.855 10.377
(2.231) (2.216) (1.358) (1.295) (1.834)
Cyclical youth unemployment (in Ror) 0.154 0.101 0.043 0.041 0.074
(1.079) (1.044) (0.982) (1.020) (1.026)
Nr. of apprenticeship positions (in Ror) 98.380 98.544 98.538 99.368 98.791
(4.906) (5.261) (5.600) (5.124) (5.279)
Nr. of students (in Ror) 23.700 22.711 24.156 25.730 24.095
(14.204) (14.354) (13.991) (14.091) (14.223)
Nr. of high school graduates (in Ror) 26.081 25.755 27.289 27.758 26.775
(6.313) (6.526) (6.218) (7.064) (6.673)
Nr. of Universities (in Ror) 10.789 9.620 10.916 11.381 10.585
(10.304) (9.666) (10.037) (9.988) (9.938)
N 331 (9.17%) 1’302 (36.07%) 826 (22.88%) 1’151 (31.88%) 3’610
Note: Table presents sample means and standard deviations in brackets in total and by aspiration levels. Individual
characteristics are assessed at the time of answering the Youth Questionnaire (with 17). GPA is the grade point average of
German and Math grades, standardized and reversed, that higher values indicate better performance. Three indicators for
school recommendations (with the age of 10), one indicator indicating if the student is currently in high school. Locus of
control, openness, agreeableness, extraversion, neuroticism, and conscientiousness are principal components, std- stands
for standardized to (0,1), where small deviations result from missings. We define second-generation migrants as having
both parents born in a foreign country, parents college educated/unemployed if at least one has a college degree, is
currently unemployed, cyclical component of youth unemployment in the region is extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott-
Filter. The number of Universities in the region include all higher learning institutions.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 2: Determinants of subjective completion beliefs, OLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA (std) 0.037 0.029 0.029 0.029
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rec: Lowest Track (yes/no) 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.028
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.061 0.058 0.052 0.056
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.046 0.042 0.034 0.039
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
In high school (yes/no) 0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Locus of control (std) 0.022 0.019 0.019
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Risk attitudes (std) 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Openness (std) 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Agreeableness (std) 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Extraversion (std) 0.016 0.017 0.017
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Neuroticism (std) 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conscientiousness (std) 0.031 0.034 0.034
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female (yes/no) -0.013 -0.013
(0.007) (0.007)
Nr. siblings -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) -0.022 -0.010
(0.007) (0.013)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.007 0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) -0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.013)
Log. net household income 0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.002)
N 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
p¯ 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776
SD(p) 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198
adjR2 0.052 0.107 0.115 0.116
Academic + + + +
F(pval) 30.470 (0.000) 20.679 (0.000) 17.564 (0.000) 17.029 (0.000)
Personality - + + +
F(pval) 24.168 (0.000) 24.626 (0.000) 24.328 (0.000)
Background - - + +
F(pval) 3.796 (0.000) 2.431 (0.013)
Labor market + FE - - - +
F(pval) 1.257 (0.184)
Note: Table presents coefficients, from linear regressions of subjective beliefs on varying sets of covariates, in
(1) only on academic, (2) adds personality, (3) family background and individual characteristics, and (4) local
labor market characteristics, region and time fixed effects (coefficients not presented). No recommendation is
the base category, we include indicator variables for missing values in any of the covariates. Robust standard
errors are given in brackets. We present the unconditional mean p¯ and standard deviation SD(p) of the
dependent variable, the adjusted R2, and joint significance tests. In the appendix we present analogous
fractional response regressions.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 3: Effect of subjective completion beliefs on educational outcomes
probit probit eev
ρ = .1 ρ = .3 ρ = .5 ρ = ρˆo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.921 0.809 0.726 0.716 0.612 0.383 0.120 0.561
(0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) (0.149) (0.141) (0.129) (0.168)
[0.140] [0.121] [0.108] [0.104]
R2n 0.029 0.040 0.048 0.059
R2n(p) 0.049 0.055 0.059 0.069
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.776, SD(p) = 0.198, ρˆo(se) = 0.147(0.003)
(B) Actual investment
p 0.997 0.915 0.908 0.866 0.762 0.527 0.250 0.846
(0.223) (0.228) (0.240) (0.249) (0.250) (0.247) (0.215) (0.234)
[0.069] [0.062] [0.056] [0.044]
R2n 0.087 0.100 0.122 0.184
R2n(p) 0.113 0.121 0.141 0.199
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.772, SD(p) = 0.201, ρˆo(se) = 0.021(0.003)
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.901 0.845 0.836 0.726 0.622 0.393 0.129 0.716
(0.256) (0.262) (0.272) (0.276) (0.277) (0.269) (0.240) (0.141)
[0.058] [0.053] [0.048] [0.031]
R2n 0.085 0.095 0.115 0.205
R2n(p) 0.104 0.111 0.129 0.214
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.192, ρˆo(se) = 0.010(0.002)
(D) Actual completion
p 0.434 0.410 0.351 0.331 0.229 0.015 -0.214 0.326
(0.181) (0.185) (0.189) (0.192) (0.190) (0.190) (0.171) (0.094)
[0.172] [0.162] [0.139] [0.131]
R2n 0.089 0.093 0.102 0.123
R2n(p) 0.092 0.096 0.104 0.124
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.197 , ρˆo(se) = 0.005(0.003)
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.467 0.478 0.439 0.421 0.319 0.102 -0.135 0.418
(0.198) (0.202) (0.206) (0.210) (0.210) (0.191) (0.197) (0.083)
[0.185] [0.189] [0.174] [0.167]
R2n 0.095 0.098 0.108 0.127
R2n(p) 0.099 0.101 0.110 0.129
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.778, SD(p) = 0.190, ρˆo(se) = 0.004(0.003)
Academic - + + + + + + +
Personality - - + + + + + +
Family Background - - - + + + + +
Labor market - - - + + + + +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in
squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8) regressions
of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1)
on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8)
family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics. In the probit eev regressions
we restrict the correlation between the errors to be 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and to be equal to the selection-
on-unobservables (the estimated is given by ρˆo along with its standard error). For each outcome in
Panels (A) to (E), we present McFadden’s pseudo-R2 with and without p, and sample statistics for the
varying subsamples. In the appendix we present analogous probit and bivariate probit regressions for
dichotomized p ≥ 70%.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 4: Disaggregated intentions-to-invest, multinominal probit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Apprenticeship, d = 1
p 1.045 1.136 1.038 1.068
(0.206) (0.214) (0.218) (0.221)
[0.021(0.029)] [0.081(0.029)] [0.081(0.030)] [0.089(0.030)]
Tertiary Apprenticeship, d = 2
p 1.094 0.907 0.802 0.776
(0.210) (0.221) (0.226) (0.230)
[-0.011(0.034)] [-0.003(0.035)] [0.002(0.036)] [0.001(0.036)]
University, d = 3
p 1.557 1.073 0.881 0.827
(0.217) (0.227) (0.233) (0.237)
[0.141(0.035)] [0.052(0.035)] [0.030(0.036)] [0.021(0.035)]
N 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
LR(pval) 54.900(0.000) 36.009(0.000) 26.476(0.000) 26.237(0.000)
Academic - + + +
Personality - - + +
Family Background - - - +
Labor market - - - +
Note: Table presents, multinominal probit regressions of the educational intention-to-
invest: drop out, apprenticeship, tertiary apprenticeship, and university on subjective
beliefs and varying sets of covariates in (1) on in high school, region and time fixed effects,
(2) adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8) family background, individual, and
local labor market characteristics. Robust standard errors in round, average marginal
effect along (with standard errors) in squared (round) brackets. The Likelihood Ratio
(LR)-statistic measures the significance of p across equations.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 5: Disaggregated actual investment and completion, conditional on intentions, probit regressions
Actual investment Actual completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Apprenticeship (d1 = 1)
p 0.902 1.055 1.007 1.043 0.794 0.737 0.645 0.559
(0.256) (0.266) (0.269) (0.275) (0.271) (0.273) (0.276) (0.278)
[0.133] [0.151] [0.136] [0.090] [0.292] [0.271] [0.237] [0.204]
R2n 0.033 0.044 0.073 0.175 0.051 0.060 0.069 0.106
R2n(p) 0.054 0.071 0.096 0.196 0.064 0.071 0.077 0.111
Sample: N = 883, d¯1 = 0.948, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.218 N = 502, d¯1 = 0.669, p¯ = 0.760, SD(p) = 0.220
(B) Tertiary apprenticeship (d2 = 1)
p 0.362 0.455 0.673 0.784 0.409 0.358 0.374 0.669
(0.368) (0.379) (0.412) (0.416) (0.549) (0.564) (0.578) (0.619)
[0.120] [0.150] [0.219] [0.250] [0.098] [0.089] [0.094] [0.129]
R2n 0.079 0.084 0.107 0.137 0.140 0.139 0.148 0.223
R2n(p) 0.081 0.087 0.112 0.143 0.142 0.141 0.150 0.226
Sample: N = 456, d¯2 = 0.965, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.179 N = 314, d¯2 = 0.557, p¯ = 0.779, SD(p) = 0.177
(C) University (d3 = 1)
p 0.789 0.431 0.308 0.038 0.980 0.665 0.894 0.656
(0.367) (0.388) (0.405) (0.409) (0.487) (0.512) (0.538) (0.546)
[0.282] [0.153] [0.108] [0.013] [0.253] [0.172] [0.226] [0.155]
R2n 0.140 0.186 0.219 0.275 0.177 0.194 0.223 0.252
R2n(p) 0.146 0.188 0.220 0.275 0.186 0.198 0.229 0.255
Sample: N = 580, d¯3 = 0.978, p¯ = 0.801, SD(p) = 0.154 N = 428, d¯3 = 0.397, p¯ = 0.799, SD(p) = 0.156
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in squared
brackets), from probit regressions of investment (1)-(4) and completion (5)-(8) on subjective completion
beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1/5) on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2/6) adds
academic, (3/7) adds personality, (4/8) family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
We present McFadden’s pseudo-R2 and sample statistics for the varying subsamples. For some regressions
the numbers of observations are slightly reduced.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 6: Dynamic models of actual investment
Dynamic model Dyn. model with unobs. heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Apprenticeship (d1 = 1)
p 1.173 1.213 1.187 1.198 1.406 1.432 1.407 1.420
(0.303) (0.314) (0.327) (0.328) (0.313) (0.324) (0.338) (0.339)
θ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
High school (d1 = 2)
p 1.307 1.143 1.147 1.186 1.549 1.370 1.370 1.409
(0.388) (0.406) (0.423) (0.391) (0.396) (0.414) (0.432) (0.401)
θ 0.846 0.846 0.851 0.848
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.054)
University (d1 = 2, d2 = 1)
p 0.462 0.105 0.063 0.084 0.462 0.103 0.062 0.082
(0.259) (0.273) (0.282) (0.301) (0.260) (0.273) (0.282) (0.300)
θ -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
ln(σ3) -0.719 -0.688
(0.717) (0.708)
N 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family+Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents estimates of the model in equation (8). In the panel “Dynamic model”, θi = 0 for all i.
The model in the panel “Dyn. model with unobs. heterogeneity” estimated by MSL with 100 random draws from
N(0, 1). The sets of covariates correspond to those in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
include an indicator for being in high school with 17, region and time fixed effects.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Figure A1: Local labor markets, 96 Raumordnungregionen [Ror]
Source: BBSR (2013)
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Figure A2: Robustness: The role of the option value in a dynamic model of educational choice
Notes: Predicted probabilities constructed using estimates from Column (5) of Table 6 and evaluated at x′βj = 0,
j = 1, 2, 3. Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Figure A3: Robustness: The role of academic ability and unobserved heterogeneity
Notes: Predicted probabilities constructed using estimates from Column (8) of Table 6, evaluated at x′βj = 0,
j = 1, 2, 3. High GPA = High θ = Φ−1(0.75), Low GPA = Low θ = Φ−1(0.25).
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics by subsample
(A) (B) (C) (D) (F)
p 0.776 0.772 0.781 0.769 0.778
(0.198) (0.201) (0.192) (0.197) (0.190)
GPA (std) 0.000 -0.018 0.012 0.041 0.077
(1.000) (1.019) (1.009) (1.024) (1.016)
Rec: Lower Track (yes/no) 0.132 0.135 0.134 0.109 0.106
(0.338) (0.342) (0.341) (0.311) (0.308)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.259 0.272 0.270 0.247 0.249
(0.438) (0.445) (0.444) (0.431) (0.433)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.402 0.347 0.360 0.384 0.400
(0.490) (0.476) (0.480) (0.487) (0.490)
In high school (yes/no) 0.411 0.359 0.371 0.415 0.432
(0.492) (0.480) (0.483) (0.493) (0.496)
Locus of control (std) 0.003 -0.038 -0.020 -0.053 -0.036
(0.928) (0.973) (0.964) (1.015) (1.001)
Risk attitudes (std) 0.001 -0.085 -0.082 -0.153 -0.149
(0.924) (0.972) (0.968) (0.969) (0.970)
Openness (std) -0.000 -0.014 0.010 0.001 0.027
(0.942) (0.977) (0.970) (1.014) (1.014)
Agreeableness (std) 0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.011 0.006
(0.944) (0.984) (0.980) (0.995) (1.002)
Extraversion (std) -0.002 -0.010 0.009 -0.002 0.023
(0.945) (0.953) (0.949) (0.963) (0.964)
Neuroticism (std) -0.000 -0.015 -0.029 -0.027 -0.046
(0.943) (0.979) (0.974) (1.019) (1.021)
Conscientiousness (std) 0.002 0.111 0.131 0.176 0.194
(0.942) (0.951) (0.944) (0.961) (0.954)
Female (yes/no) 0.504 0.506 0.508 0.496 0.499
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Nr. siblings 1.570 1.639 1.630 1.633 1.622
(1.316) (1.339) (1.323) (1.335) (1.322)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) 0.623 0.739 0.731 0.843 0.840
(0.485) (0.439) (0.443) (0.364) (0.367)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.283 0.259 0.267 0.292 0.304
(0.450) (0.438) (0.443) (0.455) (0.460)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) 0.103 0.124 0.120 0.130 0.129
(0.304) (0.329) (0.325) (0.336) (0.335)
Log. net household income 10.377 10.341 10.368 10.374 10.391
(1.834) (1.800) (1.773) (1.822) (1.804)
Cyclical youth unemployment (in Ror) 0.074 0.211 0.211 0.267 0.260
(1.026) (1.034) (1.035) (1.083) (1.082)
Nr. of apprenticeship positions (in Ror) 98.791 97.920 97.886 97.447 97.362
(5.279) (4.988) (5.039) (5.034) (5.067)
Nr. of students (in Ror) 24.095 22.952 23.018 22.395 22.572
(14.223) (13.594) (13.511) (13.492) (13.517)
Nr. of high school graduates (in Ror) 26.775 25.137 25.188 24.491 24.582
(6.673) (5.514) (5.520) (5.155) (5.158)
Nr. of Universities (in Ror) 10.585 10.333 10.321 10.208 10.225
(9.938) (9.850) (9.849) (9.651) (9.637)
N 3,610 2,116 1,919 1,372 1,255
Note: Table presents sample means and standard deviations in brackets in total and by subsample
considered in Table 3.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A2: Determinants of subjective completion beliefs, fractional response regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA (std) 0.037 0.030 0.029 0.030
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rec: Lowest Track (yes/no) 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.025
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.057 0.054 0.049 0.051
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.045 0.040 0.033 0.036
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
In high school (yes/no) 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Locus of control (std) 0.022 0.020 0.019
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Risk attitudes (std) 0.007 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Openness (std) 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Agreeableness (std) 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Extraversion (std) 0.015 0.017 0.017
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Neuroticism (std) 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conscientiousness (std) 0.030 0.033 0.033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female (yes/no) -0.011 -0.012
(0.007) (0.007)
Nr. siblings -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) -0.023 -0.009
(0.007) (0.013)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.007 0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) -0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.012)
Log. net household income 0.006 0.006
(0.002) (0.002)
N 3’610 3’610 3’610 3’610
p¯ 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776
SD(p) 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198
R2n 0.054 0.114 0.122 0.129
Academic + + + +
F(pval) 193.883 (0.000) 130.487 (0.000) 109.471 (0.000) 107.115 (0.000)
Personality - + + +
F(pval) 194.414(0.000) 201.546(0.000) 199.798(0.000)
Family Background - - + +
F(pval) 31.445(0.000) 19.705(0.012)
Labor market + FE - - - +
F(pval) 29.572(0.162)
Note: The Table presents Bernoulli pseudo-maximum likelihood with probit conditional expectation function, as
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 2008). We report marginal effects and robust standard errors in round
brackets, our goodness of fit measure is a nonlinear R-squared measure and is calculated as the squared correlation
coefficient between the estimated conditional expectation and the observed subjective beliefs: R2n = corr(pˆ, p)
2,
where pˆ = Φ(x′βˆ) due to the probit specification. The regressions of subjective beliefs are presented on varying sets
of covariates, in (1) only on academic, (2) adds personality, (3) family background and individual characteristics,
and (4) local labor market characteristics, region and time fixed effects (coefficients not presented). We present
the unconditional mean p¯ and standard deviation SD(p) of the dependent variable.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A3: Robustness: dichotomizing subjective beliefs (p ≥ 0.70)
probit bivariate probit
ρ = .05 ρ = .1 ρ = .2 ρ = .3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.380 0.321 0.280 0.274 0.188 0.103 -0.067 -0.236
(0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.067)
[0.068] [0.055] [0.047] [0.045]
R2n 0.027 0.040 0.048 0.059
R2n(p) 0.041 0.049 0.055 0.065
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.793, SD(p) = 0.406
(B) Actual investment
p 0.490 0.453 0.439 0.429 0.343 0.257 0.087 -0.084
(0.107) (0.111) (0.114) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.117) (0.115)
[0.045] [0.039] [0.035] [0.028]
R2n 0.086 0.100 0.122 0.184
R2n(p) 0.110 0.120 0.140 0.198
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.789, SD(p) = 0.408
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.471 0.453 0.443 0.437 0.351 0.264 0.092 -0.080
(0.119) (0.122) (0.125) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) (0.129) (0.126)
[0.040] [0.037] [0.033] [0.025]
R2n 0.083 0.095 0.115 0.205
R2n(p) 0.105 0.114 0.132 0.220
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.805, SD(p) = 0.396
(D) Actual completion
p 0.231 0.225 0.209 0.196 0.109 0.022 -0.153 -0.328
(0.089) (0.091) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092)
[0.092] [0.089] [0.083] [0.078]
R2n 0.087 0.093 0.102 0.123
R2n(p) 0.091 0.097 0.105 0.125
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.794, SD(p) = 0.405
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.259 0.271 0.269 0.259 0.171 0.083 -0.094 -0.271
(0.097) (0.099) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.099)
[0.103] [0.108] [0.107] [0.103]
R2n 0.092 0.098 0.108 0.127
R2n(p) 0.097 0.103 0.112 0.131
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.809, SD(p) = 0.393
Academic - + + + + + + +
Personality - - + + + + + +
Family Background - - - + + + + +
Labor market - - - + + + + +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in
squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8) regressions
of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1) on
in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8) family
background, individual, and local labor market characteristics. In the bivariate probit regressions we
restrict the correlation between the errors to be 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. For each outcome in Panels (A)
to (E), we present McFadden’s pseudo-R2 with and without p, and sample statistics for the varying
subsamples. In the appendix we present analogous probit and bivariate probit regressions.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A4: Robustness: GPA standardized within high school and using federal states fixed effects
GPA, by hs attendance Federal states fe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.921 0.810 0.727 0.717 0.928 0.817 0.733 0.722
(0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) (0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150)
[0.140] [0.122] [0.108] [0.104] [0.141] [0.123] [0.109] [0.106]
R2n 0.029 0.040 0.048 0.059 0.027 0.038 0.046 0.058
R2n(p) 0.049 0.055 0.059 0.069 0.048 0.054 0.058 0.069
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.776, SD(p) = 0.198
(B) Actual investment
p 0.997 0.918 0.911 0.870 1.033 0.959 0.947 0.888
(0.223) (0.228) (0.241) (0.250) (0.224) (0.229) (0.242) (0.252)
[0.069] [0.062] [0.056] [0.044] [0.071] [0.064] [0.057] [0.045]
R2n 0.087 0.100 0.122 0.183 0.089 0.102 0.124 0.180
R2n(p) 0.113 0.121 0.141 0.199 0.117 0.124 0.144 0.197
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.772, SD(p) = 0.201
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.901 0.849 0.840 0.730 0.924 0.877 0.862 0.729
(0.256) (0.262) (0.272) (0.276) (0.255) (0.263) (0.273) (0.279)
[0.058] [0.053] [0.048] [0.031] [0.058] [0.054] [0.049] [0.032]
R2n 0.085 0.095 0.114 0.205 0.089 0.098 0.118 0.204
R2n(p) 0.104 0.110 0.129 0.214 0.108 0.115 0.133 0.213
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.192
(D) Actual completion
p 0.434 0.410 0.351 0.331 0.408 0.378 0.333 0.312
(0.181) (0.184) (0.189) (0.192) (0.180) (0.184) (0.188) (0.191)
[0.172] [0.162] [0.139] [0.131] [0.162] [0.150] [0.132] [0.124]
R2n 0.089 0.093 0.102 0.123 0.078 0.082 0.092 0.112
R2n(p) 0.092 0.096 0.104 0.124 0.081 0.085 0.093 0.113
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.197
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.467 0.479 0.439 0.421 0.454 0.455 0.430 0.410
(0.198) (0.202) (0.206) (0.210) (0.197) (0.200) (0.205) (0.208)
[0.185] [0.189] [0.174] [0.167] [0.180] [0.180] [0.170] [0.162]
R2n 0.095 0.098 0.108 0.127 0.084 0.087 0.097 0.117
R2n(p) 0.099 0.101 0.110 0.129 0.088 0.090 0.099 0.119
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.778, SD(p) = 0.190
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in
squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8) regressions
of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1)
on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8)
family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A5: Robustness: GPA standardized within federal states and including a fifth order polynomial
in GPA
GPA, std by federal states GPA, polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.921 0.811 0.727 0.718 0.921 0.807 0.724 0.716
(0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) (0.142) (0.146) (0.149) (0.150)
[0.140] [0.122] [0.108] [0.105] [0.140] [0.121] [0.108] [0.104]
R2n 0.029 0.040 0.048 0.058 0.029 0.041 0.049 0.060
R2n(p) 0.049 0.055 0.059 0.069 0.049 0.056 0.060 0.071
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.776, SD(p) = 0.198
(B) Actual investment
p 0.997 0.923 0.915 0.865 0.997 0.889 0.883 0.839
(0.223) (0.228) (0.240) (0.249) (0.223) (0.227) (0.240) (0.250)
[0.069] [0.062] [0.056] [0.044] [0.069] [0.057] [0.051] [0.040]
R2n 0.087 0.100 0.122 0.184 0.087 0.109 0.132 0.192
R2n(p) 0.113 0.121 0.141 0.199 0.113 0.128 0.149 0.206
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.772, SD(p) = 0.201
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.901 0.858 0.847 0.729 0.901 0.838 0.832 0.719
(0.256) (0.261) (0.272) (0.275) (0.256) (0.263) (0.275) (0.282)
[0.058] [0.054] [0.049] [0.031] [0.058] [0.050] [0.045] [0.030]
R2n 0.085 0.095 0.114 0.205 0.085 0.102 0.123 0.212
R2n(p) 0.104 0.110 0.129 0.214 0.104 0.117 0.137 0.221
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.192
(D) Actual completion
p 0.434 0.412 0.354 0.334 0.434 0.421 0.368 0.352
(0.181) (0.185) (0.189) (0.192) (0.181) (0.185) (0.190) (0.193)
[0.172] [0.163] [0.140] [0.133] [0.172] [0.167] [0.146] [0.140]
R2n 0.089 0.093 0.102 0.123 0.089 0.097 0.106 0.127
R2n(p) 0.092 0.096 0.104 0.124 0.092 0.099 0.108 0.129
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.197
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.467 0.479 0.440 0.423 0.467 0.498 0.463 0.445
(0.198) (0.202) (0.206) (0.210) (0.198) (0.203) (0.207) (0.211)
[0.185] [0.190] [0.174] [0.167] [0.185] [0.197] [0.183] [0.176]
R2n 0.095 0.098 0.108 0.127 0.095 0.102 0.111 0.131
R2n(p) 0.099 0.101 0.110 0.129 0.099 0.105 0.114 0.133
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.778, SD(p) = 0.190
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in
squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8) regressions
of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1)
on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8)
family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A6: Robustness: separate regressions by high school attendance
Not in high school In high school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.988 0.880 0.802 0.801 0.655 0.446 0.424 0.466
(0.160) (0.164) (0.167) (0.168) (0.303) (0.311) (0.324) (0.335)
[0.178] [0.158] [0.142] [0.139] [0.071] [0.048] [0.043] [0.042]
R2n 0.018 0.030 0.042 0.052 0.030 0.042 0.059 0.088
R2n(p) 0.045 0.051 0.058 0.068 0.036 0.044 0.062 0.091
N 2’125 2’125 2’125 2’125 1’485 1’476 1’476 1’473
(B) Actual investment
p 1.018 0.993 1.002 0.992 1.122 0.557 -0.013 -1.082
(0.243) (0.249) (0.261) (0.277) (0.622) (0.605) (0.726) (0.966)
[0.097] [0.092] [0.086] [0.068] [0.036] [0.010] [0.000] [0.000]
R2n 0.067 0.080 0.103 0.183 0.078 0.187 0.328 0.464
R2n(p) 0.097 0.106 0.128 0.204 0.099 0.191 0.328 0.469
N 1356 1356 1356 1355 584 582 582 577
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.950 0.979 0.992 0.934 0.710 0.088 -0.634 -3.554
(0.281) (0.285) (0.291) (0.311) (0.653) (0.651) (0.823) (1.551)
[0.080] [0.080] [0.074] [0.044] [0.024] [0.002] [-0.002] [0.000]
R2n 0.081 0.090 0.115 0.249 0.071 0.183 0.330 0.505
R2n(p) 0.103 0.113 0.136 0.264 0.078 0.183 0.333 0.538
N 1207 1207 1207 1206 546 544 544 539
(D) Actual completion
p 0.534 0.501 0.420 0.367 0.247 0.193 0.213 0.230
(0.212) (0.215) (0.219) (0.225) (0.347) (0.359) (0.380) (0.391)
[0.203] [0.190] [0.159] [0.139] [0.097] [0.076] [0.084] [0.088]
R2n 0.055 0.062 0.071 0.103 0.115 0.120 0.141 0.170
R2n(p) 0.061 0.067 0.075 0.105 0.116 0.120 0.141 0.171
N 802 802 802 801 570 570 568 564
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.490 0.500 0.441 0.401 0.460 0.411 0.414 0.468
(0.238) (0.241) (0.246) (0.252) (0.362) (0.374) (0.394) (0.406)
[0.183] [0.187] [0.165] [0.150] [0.180] [0.161] [0.162] [0.179]
R2n 0.063 0.067 0.076 0.107 0.110 0.114 0.132 0.163
R2n(p) 0.068 0.072 0.080 0.109 0.112 0.115 0.134 0.165
N 709 709 709 708 535 535 533 529
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in
squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8) regressions
of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1)
on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8)
family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A7: Variable definitions
Variables Description Age Missings
Core variables Missing values in the core variables are dropped from the estimation sample.
p Subjective completion belief is a elicited measure, it ranges from 0 to 1, in 0.1 steps. 17 58
GPA (std) Average of German and Math grades, standardized over the sample population, as a robustness
check we additionally standardize within educational track (cf. Table A4).
17 59
Educational outcomes: From the longitudinal information we assess whether the student has started/completed a respective
educational track.
17-31 -
d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} Aspiration/Start/Complete, disaggregated by the tracks: drop out, apprenticeship, tertiary appren-
ticeship (high school and apprenticeship), and university (includes all higher learning institutions).
d1 ∈ {0, 1, 2} First stage in structural model: drop out, apprenticeship, and high school.
d2 ∈ {0, 1} Second stage in structural model: tertiary apprenticeship and university.
Start apprenticeship Not used in the analysis, all individuals that stared before are dropped from the estimation sample. 17 487
Still in school Used in aspiration regressions, but dropped in the investment/completion analysis. 17 1,073
Academic variables
Recommendations: To visit a secondary-school track teachers evaluate the students (age the age of 10), the base
category is no recommendation, three indicators for Lowest Track (yes/no), Intermediate Track
(yes/no), and High school (yes/no)
17 249
In high school (yes/no) An indicator whether the student is currently in high school when answering the youth question-
naire.
17 105
Personality variables We standardize the personality variables to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Locus of control (std) First principal component of 10 questions, of which two are reversed. 17 459
Risk attitudes (std) Assessed by a single question, ranging from 1-10. 17 306
Openness (std) First principal component of 3 questions. 17 381
Agreeableness (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 375
Extraversion (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 378
Neuroticism (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 378
Conscientiousness (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 381
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Individual and family characteristics Parental information, based on parents’ questionnaires, are merged with the children’s information.
Female (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual is female. 17
Nr. of siblings Count of the number of siblings. 17 179
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual’s parents are born in a foreign country, if information is missing
recoded as second-generation migrant.
17 2,029
Parent college-educated (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual has at least one college educated parent. 17 13
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual has at least one currently unemployed parent. 17 152
Log. net household income Log of household pre-governmental income imputed by SOEP (0 income is treated as missing) 17 65
Fixed effects
Year Year of answering youth questionnaire, which is roughly identical to year of birth 17
Region Five regions based on federal states which are the level of educational-jurisdiction, cf. footnote 23
and Table A4
17 109
Regional labor market information Information from INKAR 2012/Statistical agency, merged onto the students residence with 17 and
lagged by one year. Some are twice assessed for the estimation of the structural model, based on
residence with 17 to avoid endogeneity due to moving (there are no missings as the location is
always known at 179.
Cyclical youth unemployment Cyclical component of local youth unemployment, extracted by HP-filter. 16/18
Nr. of apprenticeship positions Number of apprenticeship positions by all potential apprentices times 100. 16/18
Nr. of students Number of students enrolled in higher learning institutions by all residents in the age group times
1000.
16/18
Nr. of high school graduates Number of students with a high school degree in the region over all school-leavers times 1000. 16/18
Nr. of universities Count of higher learning institutions in the Ror, due to minimal variation over time we keep it
constant.
16
Note: Table presents variable descriptions and missing values for the baseline sample. All available individuals add up to 4,192, which then reduce to 3,610. The remaining
missings are conditional on the estimation sample. All variables besides core variables are included in the estimation along with missing value indicators. More information
on the regional indicators can be found under http://www.inkar.de
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